Three separate flashpoints ignited in the same seven-day window: China fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile over the Philippine archipelago into the open Pacific, US and Iranian forces exchanged strikes for two consecutive nights as a nominal ceasefire collapsed, and NATO leaders gathered in Ankara to argue about whether the alliance still functions. The timing is coincidental. The implications are not.

Each event might be manageable in isolation. Together, they reveal something more serious: a global security order that relied on deterrence assumptions, alliance commitments, and conflict-containment norms that are now all in question at the same time.

What We Know

China’s SLBM Test

On July 6, the People’s Liberation Army Navy conducted what ISW’s China-Taiwan team and USNI News confirmed was a rare — possibly first-ever open-ocean — submarine-launched ballistic missile test. State media reported an unspecified ballistic missile nuclear submarine launched from either the Bohai Sea or South China Sea, based on Maritime Safety Administration notices in both locations. The missile flew north over the Philippine main island of Luzon before landing in the Pacific between Nauru and Tonga. A State Department spokesperson confirmed to the South China Morning Post that the US received only hours of advance warning. The AEI/ISW assessment concludes the test was designed to demonstrate enhanced nuclear second-strike capability.

The test coincided with the start of Joint Sea-2026, a Sino-Russian naval exercise running July 6–13 near Qingdao in Shandong Province. US Senator Tammy Duckworth was simultaneously in Taipei on July 7 to reaffirm US security commitments, specifically warning against concessions to Beijing in the lead-up to a planned Trump-Xi summit in September.

US-Iran Escalation

On July 8, Trump declared the ceasefire between the US and Iran “over” after Iran struck multiple commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. The US responded by conducting over 80 strikes on Iranian targets, according to CNN’s timeline. Iran retaliated by striking US military sites in Kuwait and Bahrain over two consecutive nights. As of July 10, Politico reported that Trump had simultaneously declared the ceasefire finished while indicating negotiations for a lasting agreement would continue. The Times of Israel cited a UN agency document demanding that countries reject Iranian efforts to control Hormuz. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated Israel was prepared to strike Iran “with even greater force” if necessary.

The ACLED Middle East Conflict Monitor noted that violence in Lebanon and Gaza had declined in June, though Israeli military pressure persisted. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s funeral, referenced in ACLED’s July 6 report, suggests Iran’s internal succession dynamics may be shaping Tehran’s external behavior.

NATO Ankara Summit

NATO leaders met July 7–8 in Ankara, Turkey. The Ankara Summit Declaration reaffirmed Article 5 commitments and noted that European allies and Canada increased defense investment by more than €122 billion in 2025. The alliance pledged €70 billion in military equipment, assistance, and training to Ukraine for 2026. A Friedrich Naumann Foundation analysis noted the declaration projected unity while acknowledging underlying tensions — particularly among Baltic states and Finland, which worry that the US under the current administration may not honor Article 5 obligations in practice. The New York Times reported that Putin made veiled threats against European NATO members during the summit period, accusing them of prolonging the war.

What’s Driving It

China’s calculus behind the SLBM test is strategic signaling, not accident. With a Trump-Xi summit scheduled for September and US-China trade tensions partially defused by Beijing’s agreement to purchase $17 billion annually in US agricultural products, China used the missile test to communicate to Washington that any trade or Taiwan concessions extracted during summit negotiations will not affect the PLA’s strategic modernization timeline. The test also generates domestic legitimacy for Xi’s military program. CSIS analysts noted that the test underscores the importance of a bilateral ballistic missile launch notification agreement — which neither side currently has.

Iran’s situation is more complex. Following the death of Supreme Leader Khamenei, Iran’s political leadership faces internal legitimacy pressures while simultaneously managing an active war footing with Israel and the US. Tehran’s strikes on Hormuz shipping serve multiple purposes: pressuring Gulf Arab states who host US forces, testing the cohesion of the ceasefire framework, and generating leverage for ongoing negotiations. That Trump simultaneously declared the ceasefire over and kept negotiations open suggests the administration has not resolved internally whether it is pursuing maximum pressure, negotiated settlement, or both. Analysts at Tehran University, speaking to Al Jazeera, assessed local perception attributes the July 9 explosions inside Iran to coordinated US-Israeli action, though Washington denied direct involvement in those specific strikes.

Russia’s attrition strategy in Ukraine continues, but cracks have appeared. ISW’s July 9 assessment cited a Russian journalist’s interview with an anonymous active-duty Russian general who alleged that military command is inflating reports of battlefield progress to Putin — a claim that, if accurate, would suggest the Kremlin’s internal decision cycle is operating on fabricated data. The general reportedly acknowledged Russia cannot win a sustained war of attrition. This leaked narrative arrived precisely as Trump was telephoning both Putin and Zelensky ahead of NATO’s Ankara summit, with Trump adviser Ushakov stating that ending the “Ukrainian conflict” was framed as a prerequisite for broader US-Russia economic cooperation.

NATO’s cohesion question is real. The Ankara summit produced declarations, numbers, and pledges. What it did not produce was a clear answer to Europe’s fundamental security question: can European defense capacity replace the deterrence role of American forward commitment if that commitment becomes conditional? The Time analysis from July 7 frames this as “the singular question” the summit faced. No answer emerged.

Implications

For US national security, the simultaneous Iran escalation and China missile test create a demanding scenario: the US is now engaged in active strikes against Iran while managing alliance reassurance in Europe and preparing for a high-stakes September summit with China. DoD capacity to deter in the Indo-Pacific while sustaining Middle East operations and European posture simultaneously is being tested in real time. The SLBM test over Philippine airspace without adequate warning is a precedent that the Philippines and other US treaty partners will now demand responses to.

For energy markets and business, the Strait of Hormuz situation is the highest-priority near-term risk. Roughly 20% of global oil supply transits the Strait. Iranian strikes on commercial vessels in Hormuz have already occurred. Insurance underwriters and energy traders are pricing in continued disruption. Any further escalation that closes or significantly delays Hormuz traffic would spike Brent crude prices and hit supply chains downstream.

For US allies, the week reinforced two contradictory signals. The NATO Ankara summit pledged €70 billion for Ukraine and reaffirmed Article 5. But Baltic and Nordic allies read the Trump-Russia phone diplomacy and the possibility of a negotiated Ukraine settlement as signs that US commitment to collective defense may be conditioned on factors outside the alliance treaty. The Duckworth visit to Taiwan signals that at least some parts of the US political establishment are trying to counter that impression in the Indo-Pacific.

What to Watch

Near-term indicators (next 7–14 days):

  • Whether US and Iranian forces conduct additional exchange rounds or whether the “negotiations continue” language produces a new holding pattern. Key signal: CENTCOM operational tempo and Hormuz maritime traffic reports.
  • China’s post-SLBM diplomatic messaging. Beijing may seek to compartmentalize the test from trade/summit preparations by limiting public commentary. A Chinese protest against the Duckworth Taiwan visit would confirm Beijing is managing both tracks simultaneously.
  • The Russian general’s testimony, if verifiable. A leaked internal admission that battlefield reports are being falsified would be the most significant Russian command-and-control story since the Prigozhin affair. ISW is tracking its authenticity.
  • Ukraine negotiations: Trump’s framing of the war as an obstacle to US-Russia economic cooperation, combined with the Ankara summit’s €70 billion pledge to Kyiv, creates a situation where US and NATO policy are pulling in different directions. Watch for any trilateral contact between Washington, Moscow, and Kyiv that falls outside the NATO framework.
  • September Trump-Xi summit preparation signals: any postponement or downgrade in format would indicate the SLBM test damaged summit planning more than Beijing intended.

References